How can the advances of social and developmental psychology be integrated? This conceptual paper proposes to examine four basic theoretical models of social situations through which learning and development have been observed in the post-piagetian tradition: the psychosocial triangle, the frame, models of transfer and transitions, and models integrating the notion of cultural instrument. We show different dynamics highlighted by series of studies using these models. We finally discuss the notions of development and of the person emerging through such social developmental approaches.
perspective on the object, and a different grain of analysis. Yet, the use of these lenses can overlap, partly because they can be applied on the same object. Hence the lens analysing the virus and the lens that reveals the work conflict might both contribute to the understanding of why a person feels unable to work.
We thus propose four basic models as lenses to analyse research in social psychology of development. We will show how each of these four lenses works, what it renders visible, and apply them to empirical examples. Each renders visible some dynamics of learning and change, and can thus highlight processes of development. But the notion of "development" itself is value-laden, because it carries the idea of unfolding toward a "better" (Valsiner, 1989; Valsiner & Connolly, 2003) . In the last part of this paper, we attempt a definition of development that is compatible with the dynamics highlighted by our lenses, and we specify a particular understanding of the person.
Four lenses
Psychological models which are social and developmental attempt to avoid binary understandings of learning and thinking -that represent only the relationship between the person (or her cognition) and the object (or task) -and propose ternary models that always include the person, the object, and the social world 1 . How should we include the social world in development -its people, its languages, its tools, and so on and so forth? To start with, one can consider a component of the social world as mediating the relation between the person and an object of knowledge. For example, when a mother and her baby share their attention on an object, the mother can be seen as the social element mediating the child's relationship to the object (Rijsman, 2008; Schaffer, 1977) . Our first lens is given by a psychosocial triangle which enables to examine social interactions in which development might occur. However, two persons interacting on an object are usually themselves located in certain social situations. With the second lens we propose to identify how, in a given setting, people draw on rules that constitute the institutional or socio-cultural frame enabling their interaction. Then, we realise that the same person usually moves from frame to frame, and that development requires the ability to mobilise or reinvent knowledge in new situations. The third lens is offered by the notion of transition. And finally, as we reflect on the role of semiotic mediations and other cultural instruments in such situations, we propose a fourth lens, that of a prism.
The psychosocial triangle
Many authors have proposed triangular models of development (Houssaye, 1988; Mead, 1934; Vygotsky, 1930; see Zittoun, Gillespie, Cornish, & Psaltis, 2007 , for a historical and conceptual analysis). In social developmental psychology, and especially in the post-piagetian tradition, one recurrent triangle is a psychosocial one, expressing the interrelations between, person, other and object (Moscovici, 1984) (Figure 1) . A psychosocial triangle promotes a specific understanding of development. Rather than seeing it as the unfolding of inner latent competencies, or the construction of cognitive structures via auto-equilibration, it suggests that development is always intricated in psycho-social dynamics of learning. But what is then "learning"? A psychosocial triangle excludes a binary understanding of learning, as a simple influence of a person on another, or a transmission from an expert to a novice. It rather sees learning as requiring two participants (person and other) and a common object of discourse, and dynamic relationships through which the object can be constructed and roles and positions negotiated (Bachmann & Grossen, 2007; Gilly, 1980; Gilly, Roux, & Trognon, 1999; Houssaye, 1988; Schubauer-Leoni & Perret-Clermont, 1997 A psychosocial model also excludes linear causalities. A binary model could say that the social class of a child is correlated with (or causes) her poor school performances. Instead, a triadic model highlights how a child (person) facing a school task (object) has necessarily a different perspective on the task because of her previous experiences (habitus, expectations, etc.) , and thus as different relationship to it, than the teacher (other) who asks her to solve it. The teacher's relationship to the child (her mistrust, her expectancies, the mere presence of an audience) might also prevent or help the child to solve the task (Gilly, 1980; Monteil & Huguet, 1993) .
Using such a model, important investigations of the role of the social in thinking have been enabled. Experimental studies based on the initial hypothesis that "two can think better than one" have been conducted (Ames & Murray, 1982; Azmitia, 1988; Daavenport, Howe, & Noble, 2000; Doise & Mugny, 1981; Gilly & Roux, 1984; Howe, Tolmie, & Rodgers, 1992; Nicolet, 1995; Perret-Clermont, 1980; Schwarz, Neuman, & Biezuner, 2000; Sorsana, 2003; Tudge & Winterhoff, 1993) . This was done through studies based on a classical empirical paradigm: an individual pre-test, an interactive test, and an individual post-test. Used in research on the social psychology of development, this paradigm relies on the idea that, under certain circumstances, a social interaction can promote a restructuring of the persons' understanding, and as a consequence, can result in a cognitive development. In such studies, various social dynamics have been examined: the presence of an other, social marking, social asymmetry between interacting people (age, gender, social class, supposed competence, popularity), the duration of the relationships, or their competitive or cooperative nature (Chapman, 1991; Doise & Hanselmann, 1991; Hinde, Perret-Clermont, & Stenson-Hinde, 1985; Leman & Duveen, 2003; Psaltis & Duveen, 2006) . Not only are the two interacting persons "social", but so is the object on which they interact as well (Grossen, 2000) . The object -be it a mathematical problem, a school task, a game, a psychological test -has a social history, has been created by some persons, and contains symbolic traces, or cues, about modalities of relationships they demand (Chevallard & Joshua, 1998; Costall, 1998; Schubauer-Leoni & Leutenegger, 2005; Schubauer-Leoni & Perret-Clermont, 1997; Schwarz & Linchevski, 2007) .
Such studies have initially analysed the outcomes of interactions in terms of differences between pre-test and post-test performances, subsequent to various conditions of social interactions. They have progressively been able to open the "black box" of the social interaction, thanks to the technical development of video recording, enabling to observe and analyse the fine grain of verbal and non-verbal dynamics (Grossen, Liengme Bessire, & Perret-Clermont, 1997; Howe, Tolmie, Duchak-Tanner, & Rattray, 2000; Marro-Clément, Trognon, & Perret-Clermont, 2000; Nicolet, 1995; Psaltis, 2005; Rijsman, 2001; .
A triangular psychosocial model highlights how much a person's display of a competence is linked to the negotiation of social positions with another person and towards a given object, itself reshaping, constraining or enabling reciprocal positions (Light, 1986; Rijsman, 2008) . This is nicely illustrated by Donaldson's experiments (1978 Donaldson's experiments ( , 1982 ) on children's performances on piagetian tasks of conservation. In these tasks, a child is considered as "conservant" if he
Person
Other Object recognises that an amount of water seen in a glass remains the same even after having been poured in a glass that has a different shape, and thus appears as having a lower or higher level. When asked by an adult to appreciate whether a quantity of juice had changed after such a manipulation, children usually tend to consider the question seriously, in search for possible reasons for a change that seems (wrongly) expected by the adult. However, if the experimenter "wraps up" the question in a story with a little teddy bear disrupting the scene in such a way that pouring the juice in another glass becomes the solution to the mess created, then the children tend to perform as conservants. It is thus as if their answers were deduced from the negociated premises of the problem agreed upon between child and adult. In their researches, both Schubauer-Leoni (1986) and Grossen (1988) asked children to role-play the adult's role (as teacher or experimenter) with a younger peer. Surprisingly the subjects tried to make the task "very very difficult" or to check with the adult if it was now "the time to give (the partner) the trick"! A close analysis of the interactions reveals that the role-players felt they could secure their role as "teachers" or "experimenters" only by reinforcing the asymmetry of their respective positions of expert and novice.
Analyses of modalities of triangular interactions reveal that people are sometimes mentally engaged in other activities than the one intended by teachers or researchers, and as a consequence, do not share a common definition of the task -without even noticing it (Bausch, Perret-Clermont, & Schürch, 2007) . People have various perspectives on the situation, and thus simply understand it in different manners. In order to capture such meanings constructed by participants, we need to move to the second lens.
The frame
A psychosocial triangle is not in a void, it always takes place in a certain social field. Social developmental psychologists usually observe or test interactions or persons in formal settings, such as a didactic, a guidance or a psychotherapeutic setting. These settings contain material and symbolic objects, are structured and regulated by rules, and attribute roles to the participants. In turn, people will draw on available cues as they attempt to confer meaning to the situation of interaction (Bruner, 1996; Light & Perret-Clermont, 1989; Rommetveit, 1978) .
To account for these aspects of the situation and their interplay, a second social psychological lens is that of the frame. Metaphorically, we can say that the triangle takes place "in" the frame (Figure 2 ).
Figure 2. Frame
The triangular interactions happen in informal situations but most often within settings that are framed by an institution (school, hospital, court, guidance centre, etc.) or by the customs and rules of the family, tradition, profession, football club, music band and so forth. A frame is made out of implicit and explicit rules and creates duties and mutual expectations. It is a pre-constrained field of possible interactions, positions, and actions. The rules constituting the frame are often contrasting with those of the surrounding socio-cultural context. The setting, in contrast, is the staging (mise en scène) of the encounter made of Frame material and symbolic elements: the material place where the interaction takes place, in time and space, with its buildings, its material objects, its smells and its colours, the greeting rituals, etc. Of course, setting and frame are mutually dependent: the setting supports the frame (without an actual classroom, a primary school teacher would have difficulties to create a formal learning frame), and the setting gets its meaning from the frame (without the rules of the learning-teaching situation, the classroom would be just a room with rows of small tables). The setting exists for anybody; a frame is perceptible only to someone who has been socialised to the "rules of the game" of a given institution or society.
A frame legitimizes the encounter, and sets a (mostly implicit) "contract of communication" (Rommetveit, 1976) . It should enable people to focus on a shared object of attention and discourse. In principle, respecting the rules of the frame facilitates and canalises the building of an intersubjectivity, that is, the construction of joint action and supposedly common understanding (e.g., at school, people construct a frame where the role of the teacher is to ask questions and the children's is to demonstrate that they can answer such questions). However, in some cases the frame creates misunderstandings, as in the following example: a pupil (person) asked by a teacher (other) in the classroom to answer an absurd numeric question on a sheet of paper (e.g., "In a school class, there are 12 boys and 15 girls. What is the age of the teacher?") (object) will often answer by a mathematical operation (e.g., "27") (SchubauerLeoni & Ntamakiliro, 1994) . Similarly, high performer adolescents were unable to achieve a simple task of stamping envelops according to the usual postage rate during a classroom exercise (Säljö & Wyndhamn, 1993) . It seems that, on the basis of the typical classroom activities and communication contract (frame), because the teacher (other) had just been teaching proportions, the students (persons) were conferring to the stamping task (object), the meaning of being a mathematical task for which these notions should be used. In both examples, the notion of frame renders visible the fact that the child feels forced to give a "school-like" answer given the assumptions regulating teacher-students interaction around tasks in a school context.
The frame in which the interaction takes place is often framed within a larger meaningful setting, the frame of the frame. The "frame of the frame" is an institutional (or traditional) organization of relations, and as such predefines the limits within which the frame and its rules and roles can vary and be renegotiated by the interacting people, tasks and objects. In such a perspective, social reality can be analysed in its multiple layers: the psychologist-child interaction takes place in a guidance centre, which is part of a hospital, itself part of the health services of the area. However, the health service is not detached from the psychologist; it is manifested through her actions. Similarly, a school is the frame of the frame of a classroom student-teacher interaction (Perret-Clermont, 2001) , and these draw on the institutional context to legitimise and give meaning to their action (Grossen, 2000) . It is through the mediation of these interacting frames than society and individual actions shape and enable each other. Society exists and evolves as it is embodied through these persons acting and negotiating their roles and actions in such interdependent frames; society is thus precisely what enables individual actions to take place and develop.
There are also usually guardians to frames, who participate to the interactions taking place and negotiate its meaning with others. The role of the guardians is to keep the frame, that is, to help the interaction to unfold according to its rules and scope, and the participants to remain focused on the object at stake. The role of guardians is usually regulated by the frame of the frame itself.
Working with frames model, researchers render visible the fact that two persons (person and other) supposed to be solving a task (object) are in fact also very often engaged in larger activities, negotiating their respective positions, their roles and identities, what they can do, and the meaning of the whole situation (Grossen, 1988; Grossen, Liengme Bessire, & PerretClermont, 1997) . For example, while they interact, a person and a psychologist (person and other) in a therapeutic setting co-construct the meaning of the demand (object), which includes a common understanding of their reciprocal roles and of the situation; they thus coconstruct intersubjectivity in a given frame ). The psychologist's role is backed up by the profession, its theoretical references, the training received, the deontological code, etc., that is, by the institutions that constitute the frame of the frame and guarantee her legitimacy. Also, examining the frame renders visible the dynamics through which school drop-outs can be encouraged to engage in learning: vocational training program (frame), a motivated teacher (other) can help a school drop-out (person) to invest some objects of knowledge, by refusing to consider her as a victim and creating a schedule which emphasises the sense of emergency of a "last chance" for her to start such a program (Zittoun, 2004a) . Yet the success of the program might be due thanks to the frame of the frame, for example when the school has pre-established connexions with the local firms, which have agreed to offer internships to these young persons otherwise at risk of remaining marginalized for life ).
As we see, the notion of frame enables to analyse socially situated interactions. Changing level of analysis, one can also question the consequence of such frames for the development of the individual. Social developmental psychologies, as well as sociocultural approaches, assume that intrapsychological processes are constructed through interpersonal dynamics (Tomasello, 1999; Valsiner 2000; Vygotsky & Luria, 1994) . Dynamics of framing are social dynamics which can be interiorised. The frame of a teacher-student exchange is shaping meaning and interactive modalities, and thus is constituent of the knowledge which might be acquired by the person. Clinical studies thus show how the frame of a therapeutic setting can be interiorised by a person and thus become a constituent of thinking (Green, 2002; .
The notion of frame renders visible how much people are engaged in the work of defining the rules and meaning of a situation in which they are engaged. Reflecting on the new understanding possibly acquired in a given frame, one can then ask the next important question: how much is what develops in this or that frame, usable in another situation?
From transfers to transitions
Transfer is the ability to actualise a competence or a skill learned somewhere in an other setting: doing multiplications at the baker once these have been learned at school, debug a computer in the classroom when one knows how to do it at home, dealing with an actual machine at the workplace when one learned to work on a training machine at school ( Figure  3) . If we admit, however, that a person never purely just "actualises" a competence she has in mind when asked to do so in a new situation, but rather that her "expertise" is constructed within this setting, via her identification of similarities or differences with her past experience (and this is often a very difficult and abstract task), through her interactions with others, and while she is engaged in a process of adjustment and meaning making, then the notion of transfer becomes very problematic (Beach, 1999; Säljö, 2003) . Often, in a new situation, the person does not transfer existing skills, but rather, she mobilises past experiences and learns to use them via trials and errors in the new setting.
An interesting question is, what are the processes through which a person might identify a new situation as calling for the same type of skills or knowledge she used to actualise elsewhere -"same type" being likely to be related to the task, the interpersonal relationship, or any aspect of the frame? The question becomes, how do people learn from their experiences, how can they interpret the demands of a new situation, and how do they know how to mobilise their past experiences as resources that will be relevant for that situation, and to accommodate them to it?
Examples of people's change of frame can be found in the literature, and Figure 3 presents our third set of lenses in order to highlight what facilitates the use of past experience in a new setting.
Adolescents' transition from marginalised situations or from extra-curricular activities (youth-based activities, sports groups, etc.) to vocational training can be facilitated by a setting that supports identity adjustments and the process of social repositioning required by the change of frame (Heath, 2004 ) a facilitating setting does not only enables adolescents to acquire knowledge that might be useful for the new professional life, but also promotes heuristics to use it, as well as forms of language, techniques of self-presentation and specific know-how which will facilitate the negotiation of their identity and reinforce their sense of self-continuity in the new context (Cesari Lusso, 2001; Grob, 2001; Heath, 1996; PerretClermont & Zittoun, 2002; Zittoun 2004a ).
Figure 3. Transfer
How can we account for this use of former knowledge in a new setting? Thinking back to various situations in which transfer might occur, we realise that they all share one common feature: they put the person in front of new objects, new others, or in another frame. The process of adjusting to that new situation can thus, rather than transfer, be called transition (see Beach, 1999 , for a discussion of various modalities of consequential transitions, transitions which are consciously reflected on).
Processes of transition enabling a person to act, think and interact in a new situation, are of three interrelated types (Hundeide, 2004; Perret-Clermont & Zittoun, 2002) , which can be seen as corresponding to the transformation of the triangle and the frame. Each of these three types of transition correspond to the displacement of interpersonal relationships and objects of interactions (the poles of the triangle) and of their setting (the frame). These three transformations are mutually dependent.
Firstly, the relationship between person and other will be modified. The transition thus requires processes of social repositioning. Through them, the person will try to comprehend or re-negotiate her position toward others or in a given relational network, in a given frame. This will question the identity of each person, for others and for self. Additionally, she will also learn about other people (social cognition). Secondly, the relationship between the person and the object will be redefined. That calls for further processes of learning as well, including the mobilisation of knowledge and skills as resources in a new situation, and the acquisition of new ones. This might reconfigure the person's previous understanding and could lead to structural change, that is, to a redefinition of her apprehension of reality. And thirdly, the person moves from one frame to another. Consequently, transitions require a transformation of the current thinking zone of the person. She has to engage processes of personal sense making of such changes. This involves the emotional and embodied aspects of change, which has to be elaborated into sense using semiotic means. This might in turn regulate her emotions and provide the person with a system of orientation and a sense of continuity.
Thus, rather than transfer of knowledge, we can talk about a person's transition to a situation requiring her relations to knowledge and others to be reconstructed. Identifying three interdependent components (triangle, frame and transition) offers a model for understanding socially located situations of learning or development, or their absence. When a person cannot learn a given object, such a model of transitions suggests that we need to look at the personal sense of that object of knowledge for the person (Barth, 1993) , or the social networks in which she is embedded (Rochex, 1999) . Resistance to learning is often a resistance to an object which is perceived as threatening a person's sense of who she is or her belonging to a group defining her identity (Paìn, 1981 .
Transfer
These observations lead us to ask: if, on one hand, it is the case that a person in transition does not simply actualise a knowledge or a competence she has "in her head", and on the other hand, if we have to admit that a person has some continuity and does not reinvent everything each time, then what happens? What are the things or processes that permit continuity within a transition, what are the things with which a new performance gets constructed or re-constructed?
The fourth pole of the triad: Cultural instruments
So far, we have explored psychosocial triangles in which a person mediates another person's relation to an object. However, the relation from person to person, or person to object, is itself always mediated by what people can use to help them to make sense of the task or of the situation. Three sorts of instrument can be distinguished: tools that are useful to do things and act upon the world (e.g., a calculator to solve a mathematical task); artefacts that are useful to guide the former (e.g., the rules for using calculators) (or secondary artefacts, in Cole, 1996) ; and cultural element which mostly carry meaning encapsulated in semiotic codes (painting, music, poem, shared beliefs, etc.) (Zittoun, 2006a) . Vygotsky called tool cultural elements used to act upon the material world, and signs, or semiotic mediators, what is used to affect a mind -that of the person who uses it, or another person's, like in communication (Vygotsky, 1997, p. 62) . For example, a knot in a handkerchief is a sign for memory (Vygotsky, 1930; Vyogtsky & Luria, 1994) ; texts or concepts can be internalised, that is, find some form of translation in the mind, and thus become semiotic mediators guiding thinking (Valsiner, 1998) . They can then be mobilised as semiotic resources in a new situation -a future parent (person) can mobilise her memory of an historical novel (semiotic mediator) and use it to choose a name (object) for her child (Zittoun, 2004b (Zittoun, , 2005 . Tools and signs can both be generally considered as instruments when they are used (Blandin, 2002; Rabardel, 1999) . Consequently, our fourth lens in an extension of the psychosocial triangle so as to account to these forms of mediations: it is a prism constituted by four poles: a person, an other, an object, and an instrument (tool or sign) (Figure 4) . Such a prism is, as much as our previous triangles, located in specific frames. In such a prism, the instrument can have constraining role on the meaning of the object or the task, the identities of the people and their reciprocal position, and the whole activities of the person.
Such prism renders mediations in interactions visible. A boy and a girl (person and other) who are not used to work in mixed gendered pairs in their relatively conservative society, solve a task together (object) by mobilising their social representation of gender and forms of discourse (instrument), which attribute positions and authorisations to solve the task or not (Psaltis 2005; Psaltis & Duveen, 2006) . Cultivators in Madagascar (persons) can refuse to use a method of collective diagnostic (instrument) to identify their needs in training (object), because they judge that the cast of the animator (social status of other) does not legitimate him to preside their assembly (Muller Mirza, 2005) . A specific sort of mediation is given by people's uses of cultural elements enabling an imaginary experience, such as novels, poetry, art pieces or pieces of music
Cultural instrument Other Person
Object that people can use as symbolic resource (Zittoun, 2006a) . In that case, the cultural experience that people have as they interact with such novel or poetry opens an imaginary space, in which they can explore alternative realities, experience emotions that have no space in the socially shared reality, or feel alternative identities. Consequently, these uses of symbolic resources can also change a person's relationship to another or to an object in social interaction. Hence, a young man and his fiancée (person and other) can read Anna Karenina (instrument) to better understand their own relationship (object) (Zittoun, 2006a,c) .
As suggested earlier, aspects of these poles can also be internalised. A young woman (person) can thus mobilise her memories of the lyrics of pop songs (sign), which she likes partly because she admires very much the singers (interiorised others), to think about social injustices she discovers around her (object) (Zittoun, 2007) . We might then formulate this situation in terms of transitions: once this person is at university, and confronts new others, e.g., professors of sociology questioning her about social inequities (object), will her previous resources (songs learned by heart as instrument) be invalidated? And if it is so, what are the consequences of that invalidation for the person (Bourgeois, 1996) ?
Four lenses, development and the person
Social psychology of development is a psychology of the developing person in changing worlds, populated by objects and people. Here, we have proposed four lenses for examining the dynamics involved. The first emphasises dynamics of interaction; the second highlights rules and frames that regulate these, and the frames in which people give sense to these interactions and strive for their goals; the third questions dynamics of transition in the re-use of previous competence or knowledge; and the last one renders visible the role played by instruments in the three other dynamics.
A model of development
What is the model of development we promote when we are using such lenses? As it appears, dynamics of triangulation, negotiation of roles and construction of meaning in frames, and use of instruments, are all processes located in time. They imply necessarily forms of change. Yet change can be for the better or the worse; how then to define a "better" development? We will attempt to make explicit our understanding of development. We will avoid any a priori, normative criteria. Rather, we deduce our definition from our understanding of learning and change as dynamic processes. Basically, we think that development should preserve dynamics of interaction, frame and transition as explored here, that is, the developmental movement itself. But this can have various implications. For example, one might say that development is the acquisition or the display of a competence required by a given frame: if the setting frames the interaction as "acquiring additions", then the person who displays them is developing. But this definition is relativistic: a child becoming a child-soldier might be developing according to the frame in which he is taken (Hundeide, 2004 ). Yet we have the intuition that such a change is alienating.
We would thus rather say that a change is developmental, first, if it leads the person to a situation in which she still has a certain number of possibilities for further transitions and changes. A change which destroys the person and blocks her, or a change that radically alienates a person from social others, is thus problematic (Zittoun, 2006a) . Such a definition is minimal, yet it includes both internal processes and social dynamics; it emphasises the transactions between the person and the world (Sokol & Chandler, 2004; Zittoun, 2006a) .
Approaching the person: Toward a fifth lens
The development of a person appears as her psycho-social history, through which she has cumulated experience, reflected upon that experience, and turned that reflected experience into a resource for apprehending new experiences This person, as we have seen, is constantly exposing herself and being exposed to changing situations, requiring her to change or invent new meanings and actions. How can she remain who she is while changing? In order to answer to this question, we have to examine what is put at stake when the person is not remaining who she is: her sense of integrity, and the feeling that her thoughts belong to her only, which we can call interiority. Personal integrity is a complex physical, psychic and moral issue. It is the sense that one person is one and unique, even if everyday situation trigger various aspects of self, or beyond the multifaceted nature of identity. Integrity needs to be maintained through time and through space, and across a multiplicity of situations (Carugati, 2004; Erikson 1975; Winnicott, 1971) . Integrity is what is threatened in the dialectics change-continuity required by development. Ruptures of integrity are, in turn, threatening thinking, learning and development. A second, and related characteristic of that person, is that she needs to confer sense to her experience. To account for this, we need a model of the person who is both positioned within social networks, but also, who is doted of interiority (Bruner, 1990; Winnicott, 1971; Zittoun, 2004b Zittoun, , 2006a . Interiority is this inalienable "inner" thinking space, perceived by the person as one's own, and where all her interactions in the world meet her memories, wishes, dreams, and mental prolongations of her embodied experiences.
Of course, in the examples of learning situations explored so far, these two aspects are not always in danger. But when they are -under situations of banal neglect, lack of respect, negative attributions, stigmatisation, physical or psychological intimidation, violence, or humiliation -the person's further possibilities of change might be reduced, and her agency and her possibility to reflect upon her action might be endangered. In that sense, learning and development are at stake when the person's integrity and interiority are neglected. All in all, this calls for an attention for the perspective of the person when studying learning and development in socially situated interactions.
Openings
In this paper, we have shown how four lenses classically used in social psychology of development, and in particular, in the post-piagetian tradition, enable to identify social and cognitive dynamics in development. Psychological development can be redefined as involving socially framed, culturally mediated and interpersonally negotiated processes, and dynamic relation between the person, others, objects and instruments which are reconfigured through transitions. However, the increasing attention given to the complex nature of the social in development has often brought researchers to forget intra-psychological dynamics. Intrapsychological dynamics -cognitive, but also affective and imaginative -are fundamental components of learning and development, and should be studied together with interpersonal and social interactions.
We close this paper knowing that our next step should be to adjust a fifth lens aiming at identifying the intra-personal processes that can account for a person doted both of a creative adaptability to newness, and of a fundamental fragility dependent on her interiority and her sense of integrity. The theoretical and empirical challenge will then be to propose a full articulation of these different lenses to better understand the interdependance -and autonomy -of the social and the individual in development.
Notes
1 Although Piaget's constructivist approach of development acknowledges the importance of the social world in development (for example Piaget, 1932 Piaget, , 1950 , the core of his theoretical efforts remains binary, even if in a subtle way. For Piaget, as the child is trying to adapt to some problematic object of the world, his understanding depends on his cognitive structures, not on the communicative or social context. Piaget's discourse was addressed against that of the behaviourists promoting a S-R model. He thus demonstrated the importance of a S-(O)-R model, (O) designating the organism of the child. The child's own activity and equilibration processes (i.e., O) appear thus as central in cognitive development: it is via his senses and personal reflection that the child can test, for himself, how things work and what is true. The younger Piaget had called attention to the role of the social environment in this equation, as fostering decentration and offering the child occasions of experiencing reciprocity in cooperation tasks. But the older Piaget considered (social) cooperation and (cognitive) operations as the "two sides of the same coin", doubting that a specific exploration of such social dimensions would bring anything new to his theory (Piaget, 1976) . Piaget thus concentrated his work on the child's answering his own questions about the world. Perhaps this focus and exclusion of the social are due to the fact that Piaget had then in mind the power of the asymmetric relation between adult and child, or expert and novice, that so often hinders development by feeding answers to a mind that hadn't even had an opportunity to ask a question (Perret-Clermont, 2008; Piaget, 1960) .
